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INTRODUCTION
Anyone else bored to tears with the “slippery slope” arguments
against gay marriage? Since few opponents of homosexual unions are
brave enough to admit that gay weddings just freak them out, they
hide behind the claim that it’s an inexorable slide from legalizing gay
marriage to having sex with penguins outside JC Penney’s.
1

—Dahlia Lithwick

The slippery slope is in some ways a helpful metaphor, but as with
many metaphors, it starts by enriching our vision and ends by clouding it.
2

—Eugene Volokh

On June 26, 2003, the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in
3
Lawrence v. Texas, a case challenging the constitutionality of a state
4
statute criminalizing homosexual (but not heterosexual) sodomy.
The Court held that the Texas statute (and, by implication, others like
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it) was unconstitutional, violating petitioners’ due process rights, and
6
thus overturning its 1986 ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick. Justice Scalia,
writing in dissent, warned that Bowers was a necessary barrier to the invalidation of numerous state laws regulating morals offenses and that
Lawrence was, therefore, the first step onto a slippery slope that would
7
lead courts to legalize a parade of sexual-conduct horribles. Justice
Scalia offered no legal reasoning to bolster this emotional appeal, a
8
continuation of his baldly homophobic dissent in Romer v. Evans.
This Comment examines the slippery slope argument, as used in judicial opinions, so as to distinguish Justice Scalia’s seeming use of this
rhetorical technique from what I will demonstrate are its legitimate
uses.
The slippery slope argument is a mainstay of legal reasoning and
9
disputation. As suggested by Professor Eugene Volokh in his recent
anatomy of the technique, “the most useful definition of a slippery
slope is one that covers all situations where decision A, which you
might find appealing, ends up materially increasing the probability
10
that others will bring about decision B, which you oppose.” In some
5

Id. at 2484.
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
7
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490.
8
See 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (analogizing Coloradans’
right to disapprove of homosexuals to, inter alia, the right to disapprove of murder,
cruelty to animals, and polygamy).
9
See Eugene Volokh, supra note 2, at 1029-30 (describing, in exhaustive detail, the
legal uses of slippery slope arguments); Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 361, 364 (1985) (observing the pervasiveness of the slippery slope argument in
legal argument); see also Eric Lode, Comment, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (1999) (noting the centrality of slippery slope arguments to “many legal debates”); Diane Meulemans, Comment, Approaching the Slope:
Processes and Outcomes of the Use of the Slippery Slope in Legal Opinions, 14 WIS. WOMEN’S
L.J. 105, 106 (1999) (musing on the basis of the “popularity of the slippery slope”).
Beyond the realm of the law, the slippery slope has been a subject of great interest to
philosophers, both of logic and of ethics. The most useful and comprehensive of these
studies is DOUGLAS WALTON, SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS (1992). Also of interest are
DAVID LAMB, DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: ARGUING IN APPLIED ETHICS, at vii (1988)
(describing the use of slippery slope arguments in policy debates related to medical
ethics); ROY A. SORENSON, BLINDSPOTS 398-438 (1988) (discussing the slippery slope
fallacy from the point of view of “blindspots,” or defective mathematical inductions);
and Wibren van der Burg, The Slippery Slope Argument, 102 ETHICS 42, 43 (1991) (drawing a distinction between slippery slope arguments occurring in the “context of law”
and those occurring in the “context of morality”). For a recent theorization of the
slippery slope argument through an economist’s lens, see generally Mario J. Rizzo &
Douglas Glen Whitman, The Camel’s Nose Is in the Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery
Slopes, 51 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2003).
10
Volokh, supra note 2, at 1030 (italicization added).
6
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sense, of course, this problem is inscribed in the very nature of judicial
decision making. Reasoning by means of precedent means, on a fundamental rhetorical level, that most judicial decisions are themselves
the products of one or several earlier decisions that set the course to
11
the present case. And every judicial decision then becomes grist for
the mill, potentially setting precedent for any number of future judi12
cial decisions. What, then, prevents the fear of the slippery slope
from paralyzing the entire adjudicative process, from becoming not a
slope but a giant black hole whose gravity absorbs legal reasoning by
13
means of reductio ad absurdum? Probably nothing, if Volokh’s definition is maintained—except the acknowledgment that for the designation “slippery slope argument” to be useful, it must describe only a
subset of all arguments leading to judicial decisions and not (as it
might) the entire field.
To refine Volokh’s definition, then, let us say that when constructing a slippery slope argument, the arguer necessarily foregrounds not
the present case (that is, the case now before the court) but a future
case that is to be avoided: specifically, a future case whose dangerous
outcome can be constructed as proximate to the outcome of the pres14
ent case. Indeed, speaking of slippery slopes generally and not only
11

Cases of first impression may be the broad exception to this generalization; but
even there, judges typically cast their nets wide to analogize the present case to some
prior decision. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 181-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (appealing to Roman law regarding ownership of wild creatures). Similarly, as in Lawrence, when a court rules against the tide of stare decisis and overturns an earlier decision, analogy may still serve as a foundation for the new law being forged. Lawrence,
123 S. Ct. at 2481 (referencing the British Parliament’s Wolfenden Report and a case
decided by the European Court of Human Rights with regard to the legalization of
“consensual homosexual conduct”).
12
See, for example, Volokh’s description of how judicial slippery slope arguments
work: “[J]udicial decision A would ‘set a precedent’ for decision B.” Volokh, supra
note 2, at 1064-71 (italicization added).
13
That is, the process of disproving an argument “by showing that it leads to a ridiculous conclusion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1283 (7th ed. 1999). Diane Meulemans gives an amusing description of the advice given to her when she began law
school, by older and wiser friends who had already been down that road. They suggested that if ever she was caught without a response during a professor’s Socratic
quizzing, she should defer to the slippery slope. Meulemans, supra note 9, at 105. She
was shocked to discover that lawyers and judges—and not just clueless first-year law
students—make ample use of the device, and wondered whether “the popularity of the
slippery slope is based on its nebulous and amorphous character so the reader never
really knows what exactly the writer is saying?” Id. at 106.
14
As Walton observes:
It is characteristic of all slippery slope arguments that a dangerous outcome
of some contemplated course of action is warned of. But the slippery slope
argument is more than just a warning. The dangerous outcome is put forward
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in the legal context, the Canadian philosopher Douglas Walton has
noted that “the slippery slope argument is commonly used in critical
discussion arising from deliberation to try to persuade someone not to
do something he is contemplating. In many instances, as such, it is a
reasonable argument, fulfilling a legitimate function in an argumenta15
tive dialogue.” So a slippery slope argument is a legitimate argument. But its power lies in the fact that it is more than a rational argument. It is a rhetorical technique designed to combine rational
argument with emotional appeal, “an ominous or threatening warning
about alleged government policies or intentions that most of the
16
audience of the speech would be likely to view with alarm.” In the
context of judicial opinions, a slippery slope argument highlights the
dire effects of proximately potential future decisions that are likely to
17
result from the present case. And the slippage of the slippery slope
argument comes from amplifying “likelihood” to the point of neces18
sity. That is, someone appealing to the danger of the slippery slope
seeks to convince her audience that if the present case is decided in a
particular way, stare decisis will lock future courts into certain (implicitly unpalatable) decisions.
To be fair, none of us can predict the future, and we exercise the
elision between “what will probably happen” and “what will definitely
happen” on a regular basis. Indeed, as an ethical philosopher reminds us, it is that gap that makes the slippery slope argument so urgent:

as a reason for not taking a first step in the contemplated course of action.
WALTON, supra note 9, at 1.
15
Id. at 19.
16
Id. at 175.
17
See, for example, Roy Sorenson’s suggestion that
[h]ypothetical slippery slope arguments are the rule in deliberative contexts.
For here the point of exhibiting a slippery slope is to influence a decision.
Usually this is done by presenting a slope that has a bad bottom. The arguer
tries to dissuade us from taking the first step that will send us tumbling to the
bottom. . . . Hypothetical slippery slope arguments dissuade by convincing the
audience that an apparently acceptable state will lead (by degrees) to an obviously unacceptable state. Once the audience assents to this consequence, the
choice becomes an all or nothing affair.
SORENSON, supra note 9, at 400.
18
As Maria Failinger notes, such amplification is the hallmark of Justice Scalia’s
opinions, and she scolds Justice Scalia for using various rhetorical tactics (including
slippery slope arguments) for no reason other than to “engage [his] reader’s paranoia.” Marie A. Failinger, Not Mere Rhetoric: On Wasting or Claiming Your Legacy, Justice
Scalia, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 425, 483-93 (2003).
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In the absence of absolute knowledge and consequently absolute control
over the consequences of our actions and decisions, we cannot afford to
ignore the possible misuses of proposed reforms. Philosophers live in a
world of clear-cut distinctions, where conceptual boundaries are easily
identified. The real world, however, does not conform to such idealisations—although such distinctions may be a necessary means of coping
with the world. When exponents of the slippery slope argument appeal
to the indeterminateness of certain concepts they draw attention to an
aspect of truth and reality which may be obscured by those seeking to
19
impose clear-cut distinctions upon the world.

If we did indeed have perfect foreknowledge of the results of our actions, what might occur at some point down the road would pose an
empty threat. It is precisely because we are aware that our behavior
may have unintended unpleasant results that we cannot foresee that
20
slippery slope arguments have power to curb present behavior.
So, all judicial opinions might slide down the slippery slope, but
they do not. Only some arguments in some cases get tagged as slippery slope arguments, under that eponymous rubric or one of the
other pithy labels—“camel’s nose,” “foot in the door,” “thin edge of
21
22
the wedge,” “parade of horribles” —deployed to metaphorically describe their operation. But sometimes, a judicial argument that looks
like a slippery slope argument—like an argument that combines logical reasoning with emotion—is in fact not a logical, legal argument at
all. Sometimes, the probably/definitely dangerous future warned of
by the jurist posing the argument is, in fact, foreclosed by the present
case. That is, not only would the present case not be a first step towards the undesirable future case being warned of, but the very rule of
law established by the present case distinguishes it from that hypothetical
future case. Sometimes there is no slope, no camel, no wedge, no parade.
In this Comment, I will explore these “faux slopes” strictly within
the context of U.S. Supreme Court opinions. I will demonstrate that
these arguments—cloaked in the rhetoric of the law—are often found

19

LAMB, supra note 9, at 120.
For another instance of fear of the unforeseeable curbing present behavior, see
Hamlet’s soliloquy on his failure to expeditiously carry out the Ghost’s bidding.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1 (“[T]he dread of something after death . . .
makes us rather bear those ills we have, [t]han fly to others that we know not of . . . .”).
21
See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 9, at 361 (listing these labels and reminding us that
“regardless of the term employed, the phenomenon referred to is the same”).
22
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 581, 590-93 (1990) (discussing “the familiar parade of horribles”).
20
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23

in cases where status is at stake. Ultimately, this Comment aims to
argue that the seeming slippery slope argument deployed by Justice
24
Scalia in his dissent to Lawrence is not a legal argument at all but,
rather, a fallacy, “a clever way of exploiting a rule of collaborative discussion in order to get the best of a trusting co-participant who presumes that all other participants are following the expectations of the
25
discussion.” Part I will give a brief overview of the scholarship on
slippery slope arguments. Part II will then proceed to illustrate how
these arguments have been used, both in majority opinions and in dissents, by Supreme Court Justices, concluding with a discussion of
26
Plessy v. Ferguson. In Part III, I will analyze the slippery slope arguments used in an earlier notorious case involving the status of black
27
people, Scott v. Sandford, to make the claim that what poses as a slip28
pery slope argument in Dred Scott is no legal argument at all. And finally, Part IV will posit that the dissent’s slippery slope argument in
Lawrence is fallacious—a “faux slope”—just as the Dred Scott argument
was.
I. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: A REVIEW OF THE CRITICISM
For all of its centrality to legal reasoning, surprisingly little has
been written about the operation of the slippery slope—how it works
29
and why—by legal scholars. But before proceeding to an analysis of

23

I use the word status in the legal sense, as defined by BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1419 (7th ed. 1999): “A person’s legal condition insofar as it is imposed by the law
without the person’s consent, as opposed to a condition that the person has acquired
by agreement . . . .” As Wendy Brown and Janet Halley have pithily glossed this definition, “[t]hink king, serf, felon, wife.” Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction to
LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 1, 36 n.3 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
24
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2488 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25
WALTON, supra note 9, at 26.
26
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
28
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to continue this argument through all
of the classes of Supreme Court cases involving status and slippery slopes. I have chosen race because in this instance the question of status is well-settled.
29
The present limited state of slippery slope scholarship is discussed in note 9,
supra, and accompanying text. If required to speculate on the cause of this neglect, I
would posit that legal scholars, as a rule, are more concerned with results than with
process, with resolving the question “Where do we go from here?” rather than contemplating “How did we get into this mess?” Legal scholarship rarely indulges in close
reading—in rhetorical analysis—of judicial opinions, which is what is called for in
analysis of the slippery slope trope.
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specific cases, I think that it is useful in this Part to get a sense of
where others have gone before.
A. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes
The first study, a 1985 article by Frederick Schauer, is a compact
30
and largely theoretical exposition on slippery slope arguments.
Schauer begins with a definition of the trope in which he highlights
the latent threat in the present case: “[A] particular act, seemingly
innocuous when taken in isolation, may yet lead to a future host of
31
similar but increasingly pernicious events.” His aim, it seems, is to
pare away types of non-slippery slope arguments so as to arrive at a
32
“pure” slippery slope: one that “claims that permitting the instant
case—a case that it concedes to be facially innocuous and that it linguistically distinguishes from the danger case—will nevertheless lead
33
to, or increase the likelihood of, the danger case.” Schauer eliminates types of arguments that he suggests differ substantially from
pure slippery slope arguments, but his elimination process is quite
brief, and scholars following him have not found his analysis terribly
useful in practical application.
Schauer suggests three non-slippery slope argument frameworks:
“an argument against the instant case,” where the arguer is really
34
claiming that the bottom of the slope has already been reached; “an
argument directed against the excess breadth of a principle,” where
the person making the argument suggests that “the linguistic or doctrinal boundaries of the principle or rule” under which the instant
35
case will be decided unintentionally “embrace the danger case”; and
“the argument from added authority” where “granting . . . authority to
a decisionmaker” to make the instant decision “increases the likelihood of a wide range of possible future events, one of which might be
36
the danger case.”
But Schauer undermines his attempt to distinguish “the pure ver37
sion of the slippery slope argument” when he admits that the only

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Schauer, supra note 9.
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 368.
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reason these “pure” arguments have any power is because language is
38
by its nature imprecise and subject to misunderstanding. Given this
suggestion—that in real-world application slippery slope arguments
depend on mistakes and their unintended results—his cabining of at
least the second of his non-slippery slope arguments (argument from
excess breadth) seems erroneous.
In spite of the limitations inherent in Schauer’s article, it remained the most significant attempt to examine the slippery slope in a
wholly legal context until Volokh’s impressive anatomy of the subject
39
in 2003. Before turning to Volokh, however, I think it useful to examine Douglas Walton’s excellent 1992 monograph.
B. Douglas Walton, Slippery Slope Arguments
The great strength of Walton’s study of the slippery slope is his
persistent use of specific examples—drawn from both legal and ethi40
cal literature—to support his generalizations. He suggests that all
slippery slope arguments fall into three basic types: wedge arguments,
41
sorites (or heap) arguments, and domino effect arguments. While in
practice it is often difficult to determine into exactly which category a
particular argument falls (arguers are seldom as neat in their argu42
ments as theoreticians would like them to be), Walton’s division of
the trope into three rhetorical strategies—sometimes deployed in isolation, often converging—is interesting.
In the first of the three, the wedge argument, an arguer posits that
“if some new step is taken, tried, or allowed, it will function as a
precedent, which will set another precedent, and then another, until

38

Id. at 370-76.
Volokh, supra note 2. It should be noted that a LEXIS search turns up 167 citing references to Schauer’s article (as of January 28, 2005), three in judicial opinions
(he is particularly popular on the Seventh Circuit) and 164 in law review articles.
40
See generally WALTON, supra note 9 (presenting a critical analysis of the slippery
slope argument using a case study approach). This methodology is evident from the
book’s very first page, where Walton notes the use of slippery slope arguments in discourse related to matters as diverse as flag burning and human embryo research. Id. at 1.
41
Id. at 2.
42
It’s important, I think, to remember that Walton’s categories are theoretical and
designed to help us think about the rhetorical construct of the slippery slope argument, rather than practical designations designed to help us separate all existing slippery slope arguments into groups. In practical analysis—such as follows in the next
Part of this Comment—it may be interesting to note instances where a particular type
of slippery slope argument is deployed, but interesting as a point of rhetoric rather
than in any useful way.
39
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43

‘all hell will break loose.’” Walton suggests that euthanasia argu44
ments proceed along this path. Moving from the specific to the general, Walton notes that “the [wedge] argument starts in a clear area
and proceeds towards and into a grey area, where issues are not
45
cleanly resolved by the existing set of definitions or rules.”
The second of Walton’s categories, the sorites argument, also relies
on vagueness, but in a fundamentally different way than the wedge argument. The basic form of sorites is simple and elegant. If one takes
one grain of sand away from a heap, it’s still a heap. Repeat multiple
times, each time removing a single grain. But although each individual removal does not move the heap into the realm of unheapness,
eventually one is left with nothing. The problem is that “heap” is a
vague term, and it is impossible to draw an objective line between
46
“heapness” and “non-heapness.” Whereas the wedge argument begins in certainty and proceeds into a gray area, the heap argument is
marked by “the use of the rejoinder ‘There is no cutoff point,’ when
an argument contains a key term that is vague, and the proponent of
the argument is having difficulty defining the term in a precise but
47
nonarbitrary way.” Walton locates a prime use of this mode of slippery slope argument in abortion discourse, when debating the problem of line drawing and fetal viability, where the primary question—
48
when does “life” begin?—itself seems to defy definition.
An arguer using the domino effect argument, Walton’s third category, cautions her audience that “once some action is carried out, it
will cause a second event, that will in turn precipitate a causal se49
quence of worse and worse consequences.” Here Walton acknowl50
edges a problem I’ve already noted: “Characteristically, the causal
slippery slope is a weak kind of argument because it predicts future
contingencies, and because causality is not a matter of necessity, espe51
cially where a long sequence of causation is concerned.” But while
acknowledging the weakness of this sort of slippery slope argument,
43

WALTON, supra note 9, at 2.
Id. at 6-7; see also LAMB, supra note 9, at 60-76 (describing the slippery slope argument against voluntary euthanasia based on the vagueness of the terms employed by
the right to die argument).
45
WALTON, supra note 9, at 148.
46
Id. at 37-38.
47
Id. at 2.
48
Id. at 46-50.
49
Id. at 2.
50
Supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
51
WALTON, supra note 9, at 102.
44
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Walton includes it because it tends to be deployed to spectacular effect, most notably in arguments for U.S. intervention in Vietnam: “If
Vietnam falls to the Communists, they could use this base to infiltrate
Cambodia. Once Cambodia falls, neighboring states could then be
brought under pressure by the creeping Communist influences.
Eventually, the whole of Asia could be under Communist domina52
tion.”
Although Walton isolates these three general types of slippery
slope arguments, he does not claim that every actual argument falls
53
into one category or another. Most significantly for our purposes, he
suggests that the emotional thrust—and the fundamental difficulty—
of the parade of horribles argument is that it folds all three of these
techniques into one, melding vagueness fore and aft with a giddy and
54
attenuated causation string.
C. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope
In vivid contrast to both Schauer’s brief theoretical survey and
Walton’s methodical analysis of the rhetorical structures of different
sorts of slippery slope arguments, Volokh’s recent work in the field is
55
almost relentlessly practical. Its subtitle might have been, “You Too
Can Build an Efficient Slippery Slope Argument in Ten Easy Steps!” While
he does categorize slope arguments into an almost dizzying array of
56
subtypes, it would be wrong, I think, to see this article as merely an
anatomy, as nothing more than an examination of how slippery slopes
work. Indeed, although he does devote a segment of his study to judi57
cial slippery slopes, his chief interest seems to lie with advocacy
groups and how they use slippery slope arguments and suffer the
boomerang effect of such use: “One role of advocacy groups is to
alert the public to slippery slope risks . . . . This strategy can be dangerous for advocacy groups because it may make them seem extrem52

Id. at 69.
Walton’s argument should not be confused with a practical cataloguing scheme
for judicial opinions utilizing slippery slope arguments. That way madness lies.
54
Id. at 2.
55
Volokh, supra note 2.
56
Volokh characterizes the arguments based on both direction of the slope, e.g.,
judicial-judicial, id. at 1038, legislative-judicial, id. at 1038, and on the effect of the
slope, e.g., attitude-altering, id. at 1036, cost-lowering, id. at 1043, legal-cost-lowering,
id. at 1044, and “Enforcement Need” slippery slopes, id. at 1051. The text of the article
is over 100 pages long, and it would not be useful to cite each and every one of Volokh’s numerous categories here.
57
Id. at 1064-71.
53

2005]

RAINING ON THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES

1107

58

ist.” But, Volokh argues, because advocacy groups are aware of the
true risks inherent in various types of slippery slopes, these groups are
justified in their extreme behavior—in fact, extreme behavior is their
59
only possible effective response. And his true aim seems to be to
present advocacy groups with a sort of roadmap, a guide to the efficient construction (and rebuttal, as the need arises) of slippery slope
60
arguments. It remains to be seen whether advocacy groups are able
to make practical use of Professor Volokh’s suggestions.
II. SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS IN U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Numerous Supreme Court opinions make use of slippery slope
arguments, for a variety of reasons, to various effects. In this Part, it is
my aim to survey a few of the different deployments of slippery slope
arguments, framed by some of the settings in which these arguments
recur. This survey is by no means exhaustive; it is meant only to illustrate that slippery slope arguments—arguments that are completely
legitimate legal arguments—are used regularly in both majority opinions and dissents.

58

Id. at 1038.
Id. at 1129-30.
60
Id. at 1127-35. As Volokh exhorts his readers towards the end of the article:
Understanding slippery slope mechanisms can also help us think about how
to avoid the slippery slope inefficiency—the situation where a potentially valuable option A, which would pass if considered solely on its own merits, is defeated because of swing voters’ reasonable fears that A will lead to B. Various
tools can help prevent this slippery slope inefficiency by decreasing the
chance that A could help bring about B, and thus increasing the chance that
A will be enacted. This Article has discussed three such tools: (1) strong constitutional protection of substantive rights; (2) weak rational basis review under equal protection rules; and (3) proposals in which both sides win something and lose something, thus preventing either side from gaining political
momentum. We may want to look for other such tools.
For instance, to what extent can interest groups use their permanent presence, and their continuing relationships with legislators and members of opposing advocacy groups, to work out deals that can prevent slippery slope inefficiencies—deals that unorganized voters could not themselves make? Can
such deals be reliable commitments, even though they aren’t constitutionally
entrenched, or is there too much danger that future legislatures will overturn
the deals?
Id. at 1131-32 (footnote omitted and italicization added).
59
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A. Right to Die Cases
Two cases engaging different aspects of the “right to die” debate
include noteworthy slippery slope arguments. In Cruzan v. Director,
61
Missouri Department of Health, the Court held that it is constitutional
for a state to require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent
patient’s wishes before discontinuing life-sustaining hydration and nu62
trition at the request of her family. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia denies that the Court’s decision is based on its unwillingness to negotiate the “right to die” slope; indeed, he suggests that the
Court’s decision does precisely that—it draws a line, locating the
nonarbitrary stopping point where a state’s democratically elected leg63
islature has designated it.
64
Seven years later, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court upheld a
state ban on physician-assisted suicide for a mentally competent, terminally ill adult patient on the ground that it was rationally related to
65
legitimate state interests.
Concurring with the majority, Justice
Souter employs the slippery slope argument—a classic sorites para66
dox —to warn that once the door to physician-assisted suicide is
opened, “the line between the ill and dying, and between the respon67
sible and the unduly influenced” would inevitably become blurred.
61

497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Id. at 286-87.
63
As formulated by Justice Scalia:
Are there, then, no reasonable and humane limits that ought not to be exceeded in requiring an individual to preserve his own life? There obviously
are . . . . What assures us that those limits will not be exceeded is the same
constitutional guarantee that is the source of most of our protection—what
protects us, for example, from being assessed a tax of 100% of our income
above the subsistence level, from being forbidden to drive cars, or from being
required to send our children to school for 10 hours a day, none of which
horribles are categorically prohibited by the Constitution. Our salvation is the
Equal Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept for
themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.
Id. at 300 (Scalia, J., concurring).
64
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
65
Id. at 735.
66
See supra text accompanying notes 46-48 (describing the paradox of the heap).
67
As Justice Souter says:
The argument is that a progression would occur, obscuring the line between
the ill and the dying, and between the responsible and the unduly influenced,
until ultimately doctors and perhaps others would abuse a limited freedom to
aid suicides by yielding to the impulse to end another’s suffering under conditions going beyond the narrow limits the respondents propose. The State
thus argues, essentially, that respondents’ claim is not as narrow as it sounds,
simply because no recognition of the interest they assert could be limited to
62

2005]

RAINING ON THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES

1109

It is not insignificant, however, that while the majority opinion acknowledges this slippery slope argument and relies on it, in part, as a
basis for the decision, the insufficiency of the argument—and its tendency to use fear of a future case to limit a right being asserted in the
68
present—is acknowledged as well.
B. IRS Cases
While less spectacular, perhaps, than the “right to die” problem,
two cases involving federal tax law provide straightforward examples
of how majority opinions at times utilize—and at times undermine—
slippery slope arguments in their reasoning. In Commissioner v. Culbert69
son, the Court ruled that intent to contribute capital or labor sometime in the future is insufficient to make someone a partner in a busi70
ness for tax purposes. The majority punctuates its opinion with a
slippery slope argument: if in the present case we allow intended future conduct to dictate tax liability, in some future case we will be
forced to allow a newborn child to be named a partner in a business,
71
for tax purposes.
72
By contrast, in Dickman v. Commissioner, the Court rejected a slippery slope argument as it affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling that
73
interest-free family loans are subject to federal gift tax statutes. The
petitioner argued—in slippery slope fashion—that this rule:
[W]ould elevate to the status of taxable gifts such commonplace transactions as a loan of the proverbial cup of sugar to a neighbor or a loan of
lunch money to a colleague. Petitioners urge that such a result is an un-

vindicating those interests and affecting no others.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 783 (Souter, J., concurring).
68
“We agree that the case for a slippery slope has been made out, but . . . we also
recognize the reasonableness of the widely expressed skepticism about the lack of a
principled basis for confining the right.” Id. at 733 n.23 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
69
337 U.S. 733 (1949).
70
Id. at 740.
71
As Chief Justice Vinson writes:
The vagaries of human experience preclude reliance upon even good faith intent as to future conduct as a basis for the present taxation of income. . . . The
reductio ad absurdum of the theory that children may be partners with their
parents before they are capable of being entrusted with the disposition of
partnership funds or of contributing substantial services occurred . . . where a
taxpayer made his son a partner in his accounting firm the day the son was
born.
Id. at 740 & n.8.
72
465 U.S. 330 (1984).
73
Id. at 333.
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tenable intrusion by the Government into cherished zones of pri74
vacy . . . .

But the Court disagreed, arguing that tax law, with its provisions for
gifts, has built-in line drawing that would preclude a progression down
that slope:
[T]he tax law provides liberally for gifts to both family members and
others; within the limits of the prescribed statutory exemptions, even
substantial gifts may be entirely tax free . . . . These generous exclusions,
exceptions, and credits clearly absorb the sorts of de minimis gifts petitioners envision and render illusory the administrative problems that pe75
titioners perceive in their “parade of horribles.”

That is, the statute itself forecloses the possibility of the undesirable
76
future case.
C. The Inner Workings of the Law
Slippery slope arguments enjoy liberal use in cases involving line
drawing with regard to the procedural operation of the courts and the
77
78
criminal justice system. In Colgrove v. Battin, Justice Marshall uses a
sorites paradox to underscore the fundamental arbitrariness of jury
size, pointing out that there is no way to define a nonarbitrary number
of jurors that compose a jury (as opposed to merely a group of people
in a jury room):
One could, of course, define the term “jury” as being a body of six or
more laymen. But the line between five and six would then be just as arbitrary as the line between 11 and 12. There is no way by reference to
abstract principle or “function” that one can determine that six is
“enough,” five is “too small,” and 20 “too large.” These evaluations can
only be made by reference to a hypothetical ideal jury of some arbitrarily
chosen size. All one can say is that a jury of six functions less like a jury
of 12 than would a jury of, say eight, but more like a jury of 12 than
would a jury of three. Although I think it clear that my Brethren would
reject, for example, a jury of one, the Court does not begin to tell us how
it would go about drawing a line in a nonarbitrary fashion, and it is obvi-

74

Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 341-42.
76
Of course, it might well be argued that the Court’s interpretation of the statute
in the present case destabilizes the very line drawing upon which it relies.
77
The cases that follow are merely presented as exemplars and are by no means
intended as an exhaustive survey.
78
413 U.S. 149, 150-51 (1973) (affirming the lower court decision that the Seventh Amendment was not violated by a six-member jury in a federal diversity case).
75
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ous that in matters of degree of this kind, nonarbitrary line drawing is a
79
logical impossibility.

Justice Marshall caps his argument with a warning of the dangers inherent in tinkering with this number for the sake of expedience:
“[A]s dockets become more crowded and pressures on jury trials
grow, who is to say that some future Court will not find three, or two,
or one a number large enough to satisfy its unexplicated sense of jus80
tice?”
81
Similarly, the majority in McCleskey v. Kemp employs a wedge ar82
gument to justify its holding that a statistical study did not present
sufficient evidence that Georgia’s capital sentencing process was administered in a racially discriminatory way, in violation of the Four83
teenth Amendment. Had the Court found in favor of McCleskey,
Justice Powell explains, the floodgates would open and “we could soon
be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty. . . . [T]here is
no limiting principle to the type of challenge brought by
84
McCleskey.” Justice Brennan’s dissent critiques the majority’s slippery slope argument, pointing out that at its core it “seems to suggest
85
a fear of too much justice.”
Moving from the sentencing process to jury selection, in Holland
86
v. Illinois Justice Scalia locates the wholesale “elimination of peremp87
tory challenges” at the bottom of the slope the Court would tread
should it preclude a prosecutor from using his peremptory challenges
88
to strike all the black venire members in the trial of a white man.
79

Id. at 180-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 181.
81
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
82
See supra text accompanying notes 43-45 (describing the rhetorical structure of
the wedge argument). “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into
serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314-15.
83
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
84
Id. at 315-18 (footnotes omitted); cf. Toby J. Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and
Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 378-79 (2003) (anatomizing the use of the “floodgates” argument as a means of reducing judicial caseloads).
85
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan goes a step
further, suggesting, albeit obliquely, that the majority’s concern for the slippery slope
might be serving as a smokescreen for racism: “Yet surely the majority would acknowledge that if striking evidence indicated that other minority groups, or women, or even
persons with blond hair, were disproportionately sentenced to death, such a state of
affairs would be repugnant to deeply rooted conceptions of fairness.” Id.
86
493 U.S. 474 (1990).
87
Id. at 484 (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986)).
88
Id. at 487.
80
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Justice Scalia punctuates his discussion by arguing that “[h]is Sixth
Amendment claim would be just as strong if the object of the exclusion had been, not blacks, but postmen, or lawyers, or clergymen, or
89
any number of other identifiable groups.”
90
Finally, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, Justice O’Connor’s dissent
cautions the Court of the “potentially serious consequences for the
everyday lives of Americans” inscribed in the Court’s per se rule that
the Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless custodial arrest
91
for offenses punishable only by a fine. Justice O’Connor warns that
this new rule will give law enforcement personnel broad discretion to
search or arrest people who have committed any one of numerous
92
fine-only criminal offenses.
A broad range of conduct falls into the category of fine-only misdemeanors. In Texas alone, for example, disobeying any sort of traffic
warning sign is a misdemeanor punishable only by fine, as is failing to
pay a highway toll, and driving with expired license plates. Nor are fineonly crimes limited to the traffic context. In several States, for example,
93
littering is a criminal offense punishable only by fine.

And she makes it clear that the root of her concern is not that litterers
or toll-runners might be arrested for the offenses they’ve actually
committed: “[A]s the recent debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often
serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual. After today, the arsenal available to any officer extends to a full arrest and the
94
searches permissible concomitant to that arrest.”
D. Plessy v. Ferguson
95

Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson is a trenchant reminder that slippery slope arguments, when properly deployed, are
89

Id. at 486.
532 U.S. 318 (2001).
91
Id. at 371 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
92
Id. at 372.
93
Id. (citations omitted).
94
Id. For a parallel slippery slope dissent in an analogous case, see Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991), which held that a punishment disproportionate
to a crime is not per se cruel and unusual. “Justice Scalia’s analysis [in the majority
opinion] . . . provides no mechanism for addressing a situation . . . in which a legislature makes overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment. . . . [A]bsent a
proportionality guarantee, there would be no basis for deciding such cases should they
arise.” Id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting).
95
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
90
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bona fide legal arguments making use of the tools of analogy and
96
precedent; the Court ignores such arguments at its own peril. In
Plessy, the Court held that a law mandating separate but equal accommodations for white and black railroad passengers was not in vio97
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Justice Harlan’s was the lone dissenting voice, warning—Cassandra-like—
98
of the slippery slope below this ruling:
If a State can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks
shall not travel as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not
so regulate the use of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel
white citizens to keep on one side of a street and black citizens to keep
on the other? Why may it not, upon like grounds, punish whites and
blacks who ride together in street cars or in open vehicles on a public
road or street? Why may it not require sheriffs to assign whites to one
side of a court-room and blacks to the other? And why may it not also
prohibit the commingling of the two races in the galleries of legislative
halls or in public assemblages convened for the consideration of the political questions of the day? Further, if this statute of Louisiana is consistent with the personal liberty of citizens, why may not the State require
the separation in railroad coaches of native and naturalized citizens of
99
the United States, or of Protestants and Roman Catholics?

It is, of course, a truism that by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, “what is widely called ‘Jim Crow’ applied to every aspect
100
of Southern public life.” This vicious outcome, though not the necessary result of the present case, was a logical, rational, legal result of
Plessy’s rule, predicted in the concatenations of Justice Harlan’s wedge
argument, “Why may it not?”
The Plessy dissent may be the most spectacular example of the
slippery slope argument as a logically true legal argument—where the
slope actually played out and the present case led to the warned-of future cases through the operation of stare decisis. But in each of the
cases surveyed in this Part, slippery slope arguments are engaged in
legitimate ways, that is, as sound legal arguments and not simply as

96

As Justice Scalia cautioned an audience of law students, in reference to Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, “But do not scoff at the ‘parade of horribles’ in principle, as
though the marchers in fact never materialize.” Scalia, supra note 22, at 592.
97
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51. See generally Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond Plessy: Space,
Status, and Race in the Era of Jim Crow, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 267 (discussing the impact of
the Plessy decision and Jim Crow laws on the status of black people).
98
Justice Brewer recused himself. 163 U.S. at 564.
99
Id. at 557-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
100
Welke, supra note 97, at 267-68. For reference to the applicable statutes, see id.
nn.3-5.
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appeals to emotion. In all of these arguments, the slippery slope concern is that a rule, once constructed, may not be easily restricted to its
original context. In some cases, the majority argues that the line can
be drawn; in others, not. In both “right to die” cases, concurring
opinions display an acute awareness of the slippery slope, with Justice
Scalia in Cruzan confident that the Court was drawing a bright line
that would restrain the future cases, and Justice Souter in Glucksberg
101
cautious when negotiating the boundary between life and death.
The slippery slope, line drawing, and stare decisis come into similar play in the IRS cases. In Culbertson, the Court determined that
there was no way to tailor the concept of business partnership based
on an intended future business contribution sufficiently narrowly to
preclude the doctrine from encompassing a business owner’s newborn child; but the Dickman Court found a bright line in the language
102
of the statute governing that case.
And finally, in the procedural cases, slippery slope arguments are
used by the Court to underscore the strengths and weaknesses of rules
governing jury selection, sentencing, and criminal procedure. In Colgrove, the dissent uses a slippery slope argument to illustrate the fundamentally arbitrary nature of jury size and, hence, the impossibility
of line drawing and the temptation of moving towards smaller juries
in the interest of efficient case management, once the Court rules that
six-member juries do not violate the Seventh Amendment. The desire
to protect the judiciary from opening the floodgates of litigation is the
rationale behind the slippery slope argument deployed in McCleskey,
where the Court declined to label a state court’s capital sentencing
process racially discriminatory lest its ruling unleash challenges to all
sentencing processes; the dissent agreed that this was a likely result,
viewing the slope as the path of justice rather than as a cause for
alarm. And the dissent in Atwater warned that giving police the per se
authority to arrest for fine-only offenses was a step onto a slippery
slope that would end with minor offenses being used as pretext for all
103
manner of previously unconstitutional searches and seizures.

101

See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the “right
to die” cases.
102
See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the IRS
cases.
103
See supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the procedural cases.
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III. STATUS AND SLAVERY
The very act of naming things in the world shapes the way we think
about and treat them. For instance, if one labels an entity a person, it
suggests that that entity has certain intrinsic rights, independent of
one’s relationship with it. On the other hand, if one frames something
as “property,” a wholly different way of thinking arises. Property does
not have any intrinsic rights of its own . . . .
—Kayhan Parsi

104

Not all arguments in the form of the slippery slope are, in fact, legal arguments. For example, in order for a slippery slope argument to
be valid in the legal sense, it must proceed from the legal world as it
would be if the present case were decided contrary to the arguer’s
wishes. If the arguer constructs her argument on some other basis—
for instance, ignoring the changes to the legal landscape effected by
the present case—her slippery slope argument is a rhetorical fallacy
with no legal legs on which to stand. And when the person making
such a “faux slope” argument is a Supreme Court Justice, a highly
skilled rhetorician, the cost may be very high indeed.
Possibly the most transparent “faux slope” argument in U.S. Su105
preme Court history is Plessy’s antebellum bookend, Scott v. Sandford.
Its most infamous holding—that allowing the Missouri Compromise
106
to deprive a slaveowner of his slave/property violated due process —
is argued by means of what seems to be a slippery slope argument. As
Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion counsels:
And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the master in
a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property
and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the
authority of the United States . . . has a right to draw such a distinction,
or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have
been provided for the protection of private property against the en107
croachments of the Government.

104

Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical Imagination: The Moral and Legal Status of Fetuses and
Embryos, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 703, 710 (1999).
105
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
106
“[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty
or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular
Territory of the United States . . . could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.” Id. at 450.
107
Id. at 451. The same sentiment is echoed, in even stronger language, by Justice
Catron’s concurrence: “If Congress could prohibit one species of property, lawful
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That is, the majority is here anchoring its holding at the summit of a
slippery slope, at whose bottom may be found the dangerous future
result of ad hoc seizure of private property by the government.
108
Had the Court
But as I suggested above, this is a faux slope.
found in favor of Dred Scott, had it changed the status of slave from
property to person, the holding would have had no bearing whatsoever on general property rights; the present case could not logically
have been the first step onto a slippery slope leading down towards
the government encroachment of Chief Justice Taney’s nightmare
109
scenario. Because, as the dissenters suggest, if the Court had found
for Dred Scott, the rule would have applied to him not as property but
as a person, not as a slave but as a free man. The Court would have
been liberating not property but, rather, a person. And since in that
legal world Scott would not have had the status of property, there is
no way—either by analogy or by precedent—that Scott could have led
to the horribles threatened by the majority.
110

IV. STATUS AND SODOMITES
111

Lawrence v. Texas is a tissue of slippery slope arguments and re112
sponses thereto. Given that slippery slope arguments have so often
throughout Louisiana when it was acquired, and lawful in the State from whence it was
brought, so Congrsss [sic] might exclude any or all property.” Id. at 527 (Catron, J.,
concurring).
108
See supra note 23 and accompanying text (theorizing a link between the faux
slope and cases involving status).
109
“Does not this show that property in a human being does not arise from nature
or from the common law, but, in the language of this court, ‘it is a mere municipal
regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the territorial laws?’” 60 U.S.
(19 How.) at 549 (McLean, J., dissenting) (quoting Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 539, 611 (1842)). “Slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created only by
municipal law. This is not only plain in itself, and agreed by all writers on the subject,
but is inferable from the Constitution, and has been explicitly declared by this court.”
Id. at 624 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
110
In this segue from slavery to sodomy, it is not my intent to suggest that the jurisprudence of race is analogous to the jurisprudence of gender and/or sexuality. Indeed, there are compelling reasons for distancing queer law from race law. See Janet E.
Halley, “Like Race” Arguments, in WHAT’S LEFT OF THEORY? 40, 54 (Judith Butler et al.
eds., 2000) (analyzing the arguments against positioning queer-identity jurisprudence
as analogous to race jurisprudence). Nevertheless, there are telling parallels between
the slippery slope arguments in these cases that make this juxtaposition fruitful.
111
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
112
And the present discussion does not presume to address all—or even most—of
the aspects of the case. My concern here is to establish the majority’s ruling on the
changed status of gay men and lesbians and then to argue that Justice Scalia has constructed a faux slope based on his denial of the status shift. A number of scholars have

2005]

RAINING ON THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES

1117

been deployed to restrict the rights of minorities, it is poetically just
that at the core of the majority opinion—decriminalizing private, consensual sodomy between adult same-sex couples and overturning the
113
Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick —lies a slippery slope argument by means of which the status of gay men and lesbians in the
United States is redefined. Justice Kennedy situates Bowers at the head
of a slippery slope, arguing that while sodomy laws claim to do no
more than restrict a single, particular act of sexual intimacy, in fact
the effect of that act’s criminalization is the blurring of the line between act and actor, between conduct and status. While the present
case is only the criminalization of a single act, the unpleasant and undesired future result is the unconstitutional restriction of the liberty of
114
all gay men and lesbians. As Justice Kennedy writes:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply
about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers
and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have
more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the
home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that,
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the
115
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.

That is, sodomy laws—taken together with the Bowers ruling that
defined (and then denied) a homosexual’s liberty interest narrowly as

offered incisive and insightful readings of the Lawrence decision’s meaning and potential impact. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental
Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004) (tracing the development of substantive due process jurisprudence from Bowers through Lawrence and
speculating upon the doctrine’s future); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of
Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27 (suggesting that ultimately a doctrine of procedural—rather than substantive—due process is the engine
moving the majority); Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003
SUP. CT. REV. 75 (drawing attention to the limiting effects of the seemingly deliberate
ambiguity of many of the majority opinion’s key passages); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics,
88 MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004) (surveying the history and implications of Lawrence as a
conservative, libertarian opinion championing tolerance for, rather than acceptance
of, homosexuals); Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528 (2004) (demonstrating that the decriminalization of homosexual intimate conduct has ratcheted up state regulation of homosexuality).
113
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
114
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
115
Id. (emphasis added).
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“whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
116
homosexuals to engage in sodomy,” —criminalize homosexual conduct. And that criminalization, Justice Kennedy argues, begins a slide
down a slope that ends with the stigmatization of homosexual status:
“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State,
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
117
Ultimately, the Lawrence majority rolls back the Bowers
spheres.”
Court’s narrow definition of an adult’s sexual privacy liberty interest
in favor of a more expansive one that permits “adults [to] choose to
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their
118
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence layers slippery slope argument
119
upon slippery slope argument. But it is a single, small section of his
opinion that is of interest here and that reveals at least part of the dissent to be a faux slope. Justice Scalia warns us, loudly, that “[t]he impossibility of distinguishing homosexuality from other traditional ‘mor120
als’ offenses” sets the majority rule at the top of a slope that will
invariably lead to the overturning of “[s]tate laws against bigamy,
same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
121
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.” But I would argue that one of
the things that the majority does is precisely to distinguish homosexuality—that is, the status—from criminality by grouping homosexuals
116

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482. Laurence Tribe expresses this most eloquently
when he writes:
The outlawed acts—visualized in ways that obscure their similarity to what
most sexually active adults themselves routinely do—come to represent human identities, and this reductionist conflation of ostracized identity with outlawed act in turn reinforces the vicious cycle of distancing and stigma that
preserves the equilibrium of oppression in one of the several distinct dynamics at play in the legal construction of social hierarchy.
Tribe, supra note 112, at 1896.
118
123 S. Ct. at 2478. As Bernard Harcourt suggests, “The loudest message that
Lawrence conveys is: ‘what two consenting mature adults do in their own bedroom (as
long as they are not hurting anyone) is none of the government’s business.’” Bernard
E. Harcourt, Supreme Court Review—Forward: “You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free
Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers [Raising Questions
About Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503,
511 (2004).
119
There is much to be said elsewhere about the rhetoric of his opinion, particularly his bitter and sardonic use of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
120
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (emphasis added) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121
Id.
117
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with heterosexuals under the rubric of “free persons.”
That is, by
deciding the case on due process grounds rather than on equal protection grounds (as per Justice O’Connor’s concurrence), the majority would seem to say precisely that the issue here is not whether a
sodomy law can treat homosexuals differently from heterosexuals.
Rather, the majority makes a statement about a right—of sexual privacy—that accrues to all citizens, gay and straight. The Lawrence majority says that it is unconstitutional to withhold this right from certain
citizens based on status.
But each of the characters in Justice Scalia’s parade of horribles is
an act, a mode of conduct, presumably forbidden somewhere in the
123
United States. None of them is related to homosexuality per se, and
124
none of them could arguably be a matter of status. Bigamy, bestiality, fornication, and their fellow travelers in Justice Scalia’s litany are
all descriptors of behavior. One earns those labels by doing some act.
But homosexuality is status and not conduct; it describes a state of being
rather than a particular act. The offenses in Justice Scalia’s parade of
horribles are no more likely to be held unconstitutional today than
they were a year ago, when only heterosexual status carried the privilege of sexual privacy. Broadening that right to include gay men and
lesbians has not set the Court on the libertarian slippery slope that so
infuriates Justice Scalia; on the contrary, it serves to level the slope
that led courts to elide “homosexual” and “criminal.”
To put this another way: Justice Scalia warns that Lawrence’s expansion of the fundamental right to sexual privacy is the first step
along a slippery slope that will make it impossible for states to criminalize other private sexual acts. In fact, however, because this case
122

Id. at 2478 (majority opinion).
The question of whether the criminalization of any one of those acts has truly
been left without a rational basis in Lawrence’s wake is beyond the scope of this Comment and is yet another angle from which to critique Justice Scalia’s slope-building
technique. For an analysis of where state laws criminalizing incest stand in the postLawrence era, see Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 337,
348-55 (2004).
124
Same-sex civil marriage, not one of Justice Scalia’s “horribles” but included
later in his dissent as yet another undesired future case, Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496, is
certainly a question of status. But even when Bowers was still good law, the withholding
of marriage—or at least the rights and privileges of marriage—from same-sex couples
was ruled unconstitutional under the state constitutions of Hawaii, Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44, 66 (Haw. 1993); Alaska, Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562
CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998), aff’d, Brause v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 21
P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001); and Vermont, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999). So
it is unconvincing to argue that, in overruling Bowers, Lawrence marks the beginning of
a slide down that slope.
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turns on a question of status, I would argue that the fundamental
right to sexual privacy is unchanged per se. It still is the right of two
(and not three or four or seven) consenting (and not coerced by any
physical or emotional means) non-consanguine (and not siblings or
parent and child) adults (and not an adult with a child or an adult
with an animal) to choose to engage in a private, sexual relationship.
All that is changed is that the definition of “adult” has been read to
125
Any relationinclude all adults, irrespective of sexual orientation.
ship that doesn’t track the fundamental right—and all of Justice
Scalia’s horribles fall into this category—could still be criminalized by
a state without Lawrence creating a constitutional block. Justice Scalia
makes the claim that the right has changed, which it has not.
In Dred Scott, it was the dissent that recognized that a rule that
changed the status of a black man from property to human being did
nothing to endanger private property in general. In Lawrence, the majority recognized that extending sexual privacy to all citizens, irrespective of sexual orientation, did nothing to alter the criminality of incest,
bestiality, and polygamy.
CONCLUSION
Slippery slope arguments are highly effective legal arguments
when reasonably and logically deployed. But it may be difficult to distinguish true slopes from false, because the slippery slope trope uses
analogy and precedent, legal tools so familiar that they are rendered
nearly invisible in judicial opinions. This Comment begins an exploration of the relationship between shifts in status and faux slopes so as
to expose both the fallacies in those arguments and the dangers inherent in them. The unexamined slippery slope argument may in fact
be a Trojan horse for the jurisprudence of hate.
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I would posit that this is what Justice Kennedy means when he says that although the majority was deciding Lawrence on due process and not equal protection
grounds, the decision “advances both interests.” Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.

